Competition May Increase Social Happiness in Bipartite Matching Problem by Kong, Yi-Xiu et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
09
08
8v
2 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  2
5 J
un
 20
18
Competition May Increase Social Happiness in Bipartite
Matching Problem
Yi-Xiu Konga,b, Guang-Hui Yuanc, Lei Zhoua, Rui-Jie Wub, Gui-Yuan
Shia,b,∗
aCollege of Computer Engineering, Huaiyin Institute of Technology, Huaian 233003, PR
China
bDepartment of Physics, University of Fribourg, Fribourg 1700, Switzerland
cFintech Research Institute, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai
200433, PR China
Abstract
Bipartite matching problem is to study two disjoint groups of agents who
need to be matched pairwise. It can be applied to many real-world scenarios
and explain many social phenomena. In this article, we study the effect of
competition on bipartite matching problem by introducing correlated wish
list. The results show that proper competition can improve the overall hap-
piness of society and also reduce the instability of the matching result of
unequal sized bipartite matching.
1. Introduction
Bipartite matching problem is to study that how the two disjoint groups
of agents can be matched pairwise for their personal preferences, such as the
matching between men and women, students and colleges, workers and jobs,
consumers and products[1–3] and many other scenarios[4–7]. For convenience
we use the paradigm of marriage problem, where N men and N women need
be matched. In this problem, each participant is selfish, everyone tries to
optimize their own choices and the competition is inevitable. A key question
is how to find a stable solution in which there is no such a pair of man and
woman who both prefer each other than the assigned partner[8]. The number
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of stable solutions is very large[9, 10], the most famous one among them is
obtained by the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which was awarded the Nobel Prize
Economics in 2012.
In 1962, Gale and Shapley proved that for the same number of men
and women, a stable solution can always be obtained through Gale-Shapley
algorithm[1]. In this algorithm, every agent has a wish list, which is a ranking
list of all members from the opposite sex. Men act as suitors and send pro-
posals to women according to their wish lists. When a woman has multiple
candidate partners, she always retains the one she desires most. The algo-
rithm will continue until all people find their spouse. This matching result
can easily be proved stable, because the only way for men to improve their
current situation is to send proposals to women who have rejected them-
selves, and the spouse of these women must be in front of this man in her
list. Besides, it has also proved to be the men-optimal solution among all
stable solutions.
Statistical physicists also find areas of interest in the bipartite matching
problem because the model is very similar to a system in which two different
particles interact[11, 12]. We assume that everyone’s satisfaction is corre-
sponding to the ranking of her/his spouses in her/his wish list[13]. It can be
seen as a cost function, or energy in physicist terminology. If a person just
happens to match with the person at the top of her/his wish list as a spouse,
then he will be the happiest and have an energy of 1. In the worst case, one
had to choose the person at the bottom of the list and the final energy was
N. In most of the previous researches[9, 13, 14], for simplicity, the wish lists
are always established randomly and independently.
Physicists are always eager to find a solution with the lowest energy,
which is often called the ground state[14–17]. The replica method in spin
glass is used to compute the global optimal solution in the bipartite matching
problem[15], and the result gives that the average energy of each individual in
the ground state is 0.808
√
N [13]. However, 24.2% of men can find one or more
women[14], so that both of them prefer each other to their current spouse.
Therefore, this ground state solution is very unstable. Moreover, the Mean
Field Theory is utilized to calculate the average energy of the stable solution
obtained by Gale-Shapley algorithm[13]. In this case, the average energy of
men is log(N), and the average energy of women is N/log(N). Further, with
the aid of the energy distribution function, it is proved that for all stable
solutions, there exists a relationship ǫm ∗ ǫw = N . The average energy is ǫg =
(ǫm+ ǫw)/2 = 0.5(ǫm+N/ǫm). It is easy to see that the global optimal stable
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solution corresponds to the same energy
√
N for both men and women, which
is a little worse than the global optimal solution. In addition, it is worthwhile
to mention that the men-optimal solution has the highest total social energy
among all stable solutions. After that, various issues were investigated, such
as the matching problem under partial information[18, 19], which means the
lists of men only contain a fraction of all women, or people have a spatial
distribution and tend to match with people who are geometrically closer, etc.
One of the interesting questions is, if people’s wish lists are correlated,
which will induce competition among the agents on the same side, then how
will the competition affect the matching results? In previous studies[20],
numerical simulation showed that the exerting of competition will lead to
higher energy and lower happiness. Here we thoroughly study the impact
of competition on bipartite matching, and instead of intuitive result that
competition may reduce the well-being of the society, our result shows that
proper competition can make society happier. On the other hand, a recent
research[21] shows that random bipartite matching is very unstable because
reducing only one woman will lead to a dramatic change in the matching
result. However, unstable situations are rarely observed in real life, even
though the numbers of matching parties in reality are often different. Our
research shows introducing competition can effectively increase the stability
of the matching result and explain the absence of the unstable situation in
daily observation.
2. Method
The Gale-Shapley algorithm[1] is described below: suppose we have two
disjoint sets of N men and N women who need to be matched pairwise. Each
person has her/his wish list in which stores the ranking of all members from
the opposite sex. At the beginning, everyone is unengaged. In each step,
each unengaged man issues a proposal to his favorite woman among those he
has not proposed to. The proposed woman will choose the her favorite from
all the suitors and her provisional partner. The process iteratively runs until
everyone is matched and it’s easy to realize that this final matching will be
achieved eventually.
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3. Result and Discusions
3.1. Matching between N men and N women
Let us firstly consider the matching problem when the two groups have
equal size. For simplicity, it is usually assumed that everyone’s wish list
is completely random. Considering the process of Gale-Shapley algorithm,
men make proposals to women. If the proposed woman is unengaged, then
the total number of matched pairs will increase by one. If this woman is
engaged, no matter the suitor or her current partner is retained, the number
of partners will not change.
It is proved that on average[13], a total number of N(log(N) + 0.522)
proposals need to be sent, to make everyone engaged. Every proposal leads
to a man’s energy increasing by one, the average energy of men is the same
as the average number of proposals that he needs to make, i.e. the average
energy of man is log(N) + 0.522. On the other hand, for a woman, each of
them receives on average log(N) + 0.522 proposals. Each time they receive
a proposal, they can make a choice and decide the man whom they prefer.
Obviously, the greater the number of proposals, the happier they are. Since
each suitor is randomly distributed in the wish list, the optimal one among
many choices is equivalent to the first order statistic of multiple random
sampling from even distribution. It is easy to obtain the woman’s average
energy is N/(log(N)+ 0.522+1). When N is large, the average male energy
is approximately equal to log(N), and the average female energy is approxi-
mately equal to N/log(N). This conclusion is consistent with the results of
the energy distribution function method used in previous study[13].
However, in reality the wish lists are often not random, some intrinsic
properties, here expressed in fitness, will affect the ranking order of the wish
lists. Beauty, intelligence, wealth, etc. can be widely viewed as high-fitness,
people with those widely accepted attributes are easier to rank in front of
the wish lists. In the extreme situation, all people’s preferences are strictly
based on fitness term, then everyone should have an identical wish list. In
the beginning, all men make proposals to the woman with the highest fitness.
The man with the highest fitness will be accepted and the others are refused.
After that, the remaining men make proposals to the woman with the second
highest fitness, the man with the second highest fitness will be accepted and
the others were rejected. We continue this process, it is easy to know the
men’s energy from low to high are 1, 2, 3...N and the average energy (N+1)/2.
The energy of women is the same.
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For the general situation, that fitness has an impact on ranking, and the
personal preferences are diversified so causes random deviations. We assume
that woman i rates man α with a score Sα,i
Sα,i = ω × Fα + (1− ω)×Nα,i
Here Fα is fitness of man α and Nα,i is a random term. For simplicity, we
assume that F and N are uniformly distributed on [0,1], and that weight of
fitness ω is universal for all men and women.
The wish list of woman i is generated according to the order of her ratings
of all men. Similarly, we can obtain the wish list of everyone. With these
wish lists, implementing Gale-Shapley algorithm, we will obtain the final
stable matching.
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Figure 1: The numerical simulation of average energy of men and women, the result is
averaged over 100 realizations. a) the average energy of men and women, as a function
of ω; b) the energy of w=0 and the energy of optimal ω, denoted as ω∗
w
; c) the optimal
weight ω∗
w
versus N .
Now we start to analyze this matching result. As shown in Fig.1a, the
average energy of men increases monotonically with the weight of fitness,
ω. This is because when the weight of fitness increases, it is easier for a
woman with high fitness to be ranked in the front of the lists. When men
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make proposals according to their wish lists, their aims are often overlapping,
which requires more proposals for everyone to be engaged.
However, a slight competition will significantly reduce the women’s en-
ergy. This improvement of women’s happiness increases with N (Fig.1b),
and the competition required for the woman to reach optimal energy de-
creases as the population grows (Fig.1c). As competition further intensifies,
the womans energy will also increase. On one hand, due to the increase of
the number of proposals, the number of choices of woman increases. It can
be known from the nature of the order statistics that the minimum number
of multiple random sampling decreases as the number of sampling increases.
The increase in competition between men is beneficial to the women. On
the other hand, the increase in the weight of fitness also leads to women
tend to favor the men with high fitness, and thus increases the intensity of
competition among women. Many women have to be matched with the men
positioned in the back in their wish lists. This will lead to an increase in the
average energy of women and all people.
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Figure 2: The numerical simulation of average energy of all people, the result is averaged
over 100 realizations. a) the average energy of each person, with the change of ω; b) the
energy at ω = 0 and the energy at optimal ω∗
g
; c) the optimal weight ω∗
g
versus N .
Due to the increase of ω in the beginning, the reduction of women’s energy
is more significant than the increase of men’s energy. As shown in Fig. 2a,
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there exists a ω∗g that can make average energy of all people reach the optimal
value. In other words, a proper competition can help to increase the degree
of social well-being.
In order to study the relationship between a person’s intrinsic fitness and
her/his level of happiness, we cluster the energy of men and women to 10
groups according to the range of fitness [0, 0.1), [0.1, 0.2), ..., [0.9, 1] (Data
binning), and compare their happiness in two cases: ω = 0 and ω = ω∗w
(women’s optimal). As shown by Fig.3a, the competition causes energy of
men in all fitness ranges to rise. As shown in Fig.3b, when competition is
induced, the energy of women in lowest 20% fitness groups increases, and the
energy of remaining 80% women decreases. In general, women will become
happier with a certain level of competition, as we have known above.
In addition, we take three representative agent groups and labeled as
bottom (fitness ranges [0,0.1]), middle (fitness ranges [0.45,0.55]) and top
(fitness ranges [0.9,1]) respectively. With the increase of competition, i.e.
the increase of ω, the energy of the three groups of men will increase, while
the top women will be happier and the bottom women will be less happy (as
shown in Fig.3c, d). This change is very sensitive to ω, even if ω is very small
(0.01), the happiness difference between the top group and bottom group has
an obvious gap. For the middle group women, slight competition improves
their situation, but as the competition intensifies, they become even more
unhappy.
3.2. Matching between N men and N − 1 women
For a long time, the G-S algorithm has been considered to produce a
man-optimal stable matching. In particular, for a completely random wish
list, that is when ω = 0, the average energy of men is log(N) + 0.522, which
is far less than the average energy of women, which is N/[log(N)+0.522], so
the active side takes a huge advantage in the matching. However, a recent
research[21] shows that in a random bipartite matching, if one woman is re-
moved from the matching, the average energy of men will become N/log(N),
and the average energy of women will become log(N). The happiness of the
positive and passive sides is completely reversed.
In reality, the numbers of matching parties are often not equal. Imagine
reducing a member of passive party in two-side matching, such as reducing
a woman in the marriage problem, or reducing a job position in the labor
market, or reducing one offer in the college admission, under the assumption
of random bipartite matching, the pairing result will change drastically with
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Figure 3: The average energy of different fitness groups, the result is averaged over
100 realizations. a) the men’s energy when ω = 0 and ω = ω∗
w
; b) the women’s energy
when ω = 0 and ω = ω∗
w
; c) the men’s energy of three representative fitness groups,
bottom(0,0.1), middle(0.45,0.55) and top(0.9,1), versus ω; d) the women’s energy of three
representative fitness groups, bottom(0,0.1), middle(0.45,0.55) and top(0.9,1), versus ω.
the smallest change of the size of passive side. But in reality, this situation is
rarely seen , one of the possible reason is that, the low-fitness agents will be
quickly eliminated, and other people’s pairing results are almost unaffected.
We analyze the matching results in the case of 1000 men and 999 women
with different ω. As shown in Fig.4a, the curves are extremely similar to that
of Fig.1a, despite the fact that the gender has reversed. The women become
the donimant side of the matching. We compare this asymmetric case with
the symmetric case above, and examine the changes of the average energy of
men and women , ∆ǫm = ǫ
′
m− ǫm and ∆ǫw = ǫw− ǫ′w. The results are shown
in Fig.4b and Fig.4c respectively. It is found that this difference sharply
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decreases with the increase of ω, which explains why the slight change in the
number of people in reality does not obviously affect the level of well-being
in society.
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Figure 4: The matching simulation of 1000 men and 999 women, with different ω, the
result is averaged over 100 realizations. a) the average energy of men and women; b) ∆ǫm
versus ω; c) ∆ǫw versus ω.
4. Conclusion
In this article we introduce competition in bipartite matching problem
by adopting correlated wish lists. While in the traditional model, everyone’s
wish list is not correlated, the active party can easily acquire the results
they want and stop sending proposals so that the passive party are left with
little freedom to choose. We show if a proper competition is introduced,
men have to make more efforts and send more proposals, which will slightly
reduce men’s happiness. But at the same time, the happiness of women
will be obviously increased, and society as a whole will become happier than
the original matching result. In other words, proper competition increases
the total happiness of the society. This is not only true for the bipartite
matching problem, but also enlightens our understanding of many other so-
cial phenomena. Besides, the introduction of correlation in the wish lists can
also significantly reduce the instability of matching results.
9
Conflict of Interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Prof. Yi-Cheng Zhang and Wen-Yao Zhang for
helpful discussions. This research is supported in part by the Chinese Na-
tional Natural Science Foundation under grant No. 61602202 and Natu-
ral Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province under grants No. BK20160428,
BK20161302. GYS and YXK acknowleges the support from China Scholar-
ship Council (CSC).
References
References
[1] Gale, D. and Shapley, L.S., 1962. College admissions and the stability
of marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1), pp.9-15.
[2] Roth, A.E., 1984. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns
and residents: a case study in game theory. Journal of political Economy,
92(6), pp.991-1016.
[3] Roth, A.E. and Sotomayor, M.A.O., 1992. Two-sided matching: A study
in game-theoretic modeling and analysis(No. 18). Cambridge university
press.
[4] Maggs, B.M. and Sitaraman, R.K., 2015. Algorithmic nuggets in content
delivery. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 45(3),
pp.52-66.
[5] Lebedev, D., Mathieu, F., Viennot, L., Gai, A.T., Reynier, J. and De
Montgolfier, F., 2007. On using matching theory to understand P2P net-
work design. In INOC 2007, International Network Optimization Con-
ference.
[6] Hasan, M. and Hossain, E., 2015. Distributed resource allocation in
5G cellular networks. In Towards 5G: Applications, requirements and
candidate technologies (pp. 245-269). Wiley.
10
[7] Hitsch, G.J., Hortac¸su, A. and Ariely, D., 2010. Matching and sorting
in online dating. American Economic Review, 100(1), pp.130-63.
[8] Roth, A.E., 1982. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives.
Mathematics of operations research, 7(4), pp.617-628.
[9] Dzierzawa, M. and Ome´ro, M.J., 2000. Statistics of stable marriages.
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 287(1-2), pp.321-
333.
[10] Pittel, B., 1989. The average number of stable matchings. SIAM Journal
on Discrete Mathematics, 2(4), pp.530-549.
[11] Zhang, Yi-Cheng. ”The information economy.” In Non-Equilibrium So-
cial Science and Policy, pp. 149-158. Springer, Cham, 2017.
[12] Chakraborti, A., Challet, D., Chatterjee, A., Marsili, M., Zhang, Y.C.
and Chakrabarti, B.K., 2015. Statistical mechanics of competitive re-
source allocation using agent-based models. Physics Reports, 552, pp.1-
25.
[13] Ome´ro, M.J., Dzierzawa, M., Marsili, M. and Zhang, Y.C., 1997. Scaling
behavior in the stable marriage problem. Journal de Physique I, 7(12),
pp.1723-1732.
[14] Shi, G.Y., Kong, Y.X., Liao, H. and Zhang, Y.C., 2016. Analysis of
ground state in random bipartite matching. Physica A: Statistical Me-
chanics and its Applications, 444, pp.397-402.
[15] Me´zard, M. and Parisi, G., 1985. Replicas and optimization. Journal de
Physique Lettres, 46(17), pp.771-778.
[16] Me´zard, M. and Parisi, G., 1987. On the solution of the random link
matching problems. Journal de Physique, 48(9), pp.1451-1459.
[17] Dotsenko, V.S., 2000. Exact solution of the random bipartite matching
model. Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and General, 33(10), p.2015.
[18] Zhang, Y.C., 2001. Happier world with more information. Physica A:
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 299(1-2), pp.104-120.
11
[19] Laureti, P. and Zhang, Y.C., 2003. Matching games with partial infor-
mation. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 324(1-2),
pp.49-65.
[20] Caldarelli, G. and Capocci, A., 2001. Beauty and distance in the stable
marriage problem. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applica-
tions, 300(1-2), pp.325-331.
[21] Shi, G.Y., Kong, Y.X., Chen, B.L., Yuan, G.H. and Wu, R.J., 2018.
Instability in Stable Marriage Problem: Matching Unequally Numbered
Men and Women. arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.09086.
12
